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THE “TRIANGLE OF DEATH”
Medical Sustainability in Expeditionary Sea-Based Operations
Captain Arthur M. Smith, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)
The futuristic concept of joint, geographically dispersed, expeditionary (or“distributed”) operations emanating from bases at sea entails many chal-
lenges. Among them are the formulation and design of afloat casualty-care ca-
pabilities, especially where maneuver forces are inserted into territories devoid
of land-based logistic support. In expeditionary amphibious operations during
the past century, ad hoc creative shipboard adaptations for treatment and sal-
vage of the combat wounded occasionally proved successful and functionally ef-
fective. If flexible and adaptive joint operational medical support is to be made
available in the future, an appreciation of these historical achievements is essen-
tial. Further, if the frequently irretrievable physical deterioration of the in-
jured—metaphorically, the “triangle of death”—is to be avoided, familiarity
with the immediate needs of the combat wounded is likewise imperative, espe-
cially the unique requirements of wounds seen in contemporary armed conflict.
THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT:
DISTRIBUTED SEA-BASED OPERATIONS
Sea-based forces in the future will be involved in a wide array of missions, rang-
ing in scale from disaster relief and humanitarian operations to full-fledged sus-
tained combat at sea and ashore; in some conflicts, the bulk of fighting will be
undertaken by joint or combined task forces. In this setting, an inclusive concept
of joint sea basing—a “distributed warfighting architecture,” attuned to the stra-
tegic environment and the likely security challenges of the twenty-first cen-
tury—has been proposed. A distributed network implies a transformation of
maritime forces—fewer maritime platforms, geographically dispersed and inte-
grated with organic and distributed sensor and communications nodes. It
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 2, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss2/11
connects all the platforms and major systems deployed by the U.S. sea ser-
vices—ships, submarines, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and Marine units, as
well as joint and combined forces—in a way that facilitates information sharing
and affords operational commanders fully networked battle forces.
It is generally postulated that the distributed, sea-based, and networked force
will be capable of countering anti-access and irregular-warfare challenges in the
littorals and will be less inherently vulnerable. Consequently, it will require less
force protection, and will be at less risk of catastrophic mission degradation
than traditionally organized forces.1 Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that the
availability to potential adversaries worldwide of inexpensive, advanced weap-
ons and sensors has increased the risks always associated with ship-to-shore
movement. Ample respect must be given to the 250-nautical-mile range of con-
temporary antiship cruise missiles, as well as to the shallow- and deep-water ca-
pabilities of mines (some now incorporating state-of-the-art sensors and
processors to complicate countermeasures). Furthermore, these sensors and
weapons—which utilize precision, speed, stealth, maneuverability, background
clutter, and surprise—will presumably target the afloat sustainment base, whose
big, slow ships include prepositioned units with hulls not built to combat stan-
dards, these generally characterized as “access sensitive vessels.”2 Such ships in-
variably have little time to defend themselves against weapons employed at the
short ranges likely in the littoral. This was exemplified by the sinking of the un-
armed but strategically important British transport MV Atlantic Conveyor by an
errant Argentine Exocet missile while it carried multiple helicopters to support
United Kingdom forces in the Falkland Islands.3
In addition, the complicated task of preventing or rapidly detecting the laying
of mines, and the subsequent difficulty or impossibility of clearing them in
waters covered by a coastal defense system (including diesel submarines and
missile-equipped fast patrol boats) will ultimately oblige task force ships with
their medical facilities to move to seaward. That, in turn, will have major impli-
cations for casualty survival.
AVOIDING THE TRIANGLE OF DEATH
The expeditionary logistical calculus must always include the possibility of hu-
man casualties (sickness or wounds, incurred ashore or at sea), and that reality
must be factored into every operational equation. Contingency health care con-
siderations must be integrated into plans; neglect of these critical elements can
ruin any grand operational design.
Unfortunately, forward medical support in an over-the-horizon insertion of
forces into hostile terrain, far from supporting facilities and with no initial lodg-
ment ashore, can be hampered by isolation and dispersal of units, obstacles to
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tactical radio communication, and limits on vehicular transportation. Small
units will be required to extract and evacuate their own casualties, with resultant
delays in meaningful treatment.
Concurrently, as a result of the current mandate for compactness and simplic-
ity of maneuver units, landing force medical units have been lightened and down-
sized. Though combat operations could penetrate some two hundred miles
inland, the technical capabilities of their medical assets have been lessened. All this
implies greater dependence upon afloat resources, with the hopeful, but perhaps
unrealistic, expectation that the sick and wounded can be rapidly evacuated to
them. Unfortunately, sea-based operations may be subject to geographic limita-
tions, making the time and distance constraints upon timely delivery of casualty
care formidable. Although bases established at sea may have access to the approxi-
mately 70 percent of the earth’s surface that is ocean, ground forces employed or
sustained by them only have access to land areas within range of their
ship-to-shore aircraft. While various sea-basing scenarios have been structured to
support operations with flight distances ranging from 110 to 220 nautical miles
from the launching ships, actual inland reach for sea-based aircraft might be con-
siderably shorter for a number of reasons: the ships in a sea base would be ex-
pected to remain “over the horizon” at least twenty-five nautical miles offshore to
make them more difficult to detect and attack; sea-based ships cannot always be
positioned perpendicularly offshore (for the shortest distance) from supported
ground units; once over land, aircraft are likely to fly evasive flight paths to make it
more difficult for an adversary to position defenses along their routes.
If efforts must be made to avoid air defenses, increases of roughly 30 percent in
flight distances can be expected as well. Those considerations could reduce the ef-
fective operational reach inland to as little as sixty nautical miles for current air-
craft, and about 130 for the planned longer-range heavy-lift rotorcraft.
Furthermore, high terrain in the vicinity of the coast could further limit opera-
tions because the performance of rotorcraft decreases with increasing altitude.
(Many parts of Iran, for example, are mountainous. Nearly 40 percent of Iran’s
land area and almost half its population are located at elevations greater than five
thousand feet above sea level—and would thus present limitations to flight opera-
tions, and consequently to casualty retrieval.)4
Clearly, retrograde evacuation to ships located far over the horizon may be a
delicate and precarious undertaking, not only in its execution but in its impact
upon casualty survival as well. The future littoral tactical environment, one of un-
paralleled complexity, may impede timely evacuation and medical management
of casualties; an adversary may logically recognize sustainment as the force’s
Achilles’ heel. Lengthy over-water evacuation may be easily thrown into confusion
by sea and weather conditions as well.5
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The sick and wounded are perishable cargo; whether they survive or die is funda-
mentally affected by the speed with which they are given medical care. The timeli-
ness of both initial treatment and the evacuation of casualties is extremely
important. Even those with potentially salvageable wounds may die or, if they sur-
vive, may experience serious complicated disabilities if treatment is not correctly
timed. Early first aid, prompt resuscitation of vital functions, and initial stabilizing
surgery are particularly important in this process. In essence, delay in treatment due
to evacuation lag is tantamount to denial of care to those who could have survived,
some without disability with early surgery.6 In addition, delayed application of
treatment to initially simple wounds can facilitate their conversion into complex,
infected, and often life-threatening problems.
For all these reasons, delay in surgical intervention places the wounded in what
military trauma circles characterize as the “triangle of death,” where they become
trapped by the triphasic onset of diminished body temperature (hypothermia), the
accumulation of body products of metabolism (acidosis), and the potential for ac-
celerated bleeding (coagulopathy).
An equally important issue is the possibility that large numbers of casualties will
accumulate within the sea-based echelon, perhaps very rapidly. During the
Falklands campaign in 1982, forty-six deaths and 150 surviving wounded casualties
were created instantly by the bombing of the amphibious ship HMS Galahad by the
Argentine air force. Most of the casualties were severe burn cases; fire has always
been a prominent phenomenon following ordnance explosion within ships at sea.7
These occurrences bespeak the danger on both sides of a conflicted coastline.
Consequently, analysis must envision how casualties are generated in littoral
warfare, in a continuum of operational realities both on the ground and at sea. Mili-
tary planners unfamiliar with those realities often suggest that medical evacuation is
but an exercise in logistics, in which the number of anticipated casualties, the capac-
ity of transport, the time availability of shuttles, and number of beds available are
the primary considerations. This view, which in effect ignores the unique time and
resource requirements of wound care, accepts an overall increase in deaths, or at
least disability, and the return of fewer personnel to duty. Any new concepts of casu-
alty care must be modulated by the fact that the disturbed, tenuous physiology of
the combat wounded cannot be dealt with by standard logistic formulas that equate
the movement of stretcher-borne patients with that of ration boxes.8
MEDICAL CARE AT SEA
The history of successful expeditionary medical support demonstrates above all the
importance of adaptability and creativity in afloat casualty care. However, the be-
ginnings of sea-based medical support were not auspicious.
1 0 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Starting from Base Zero: Nelson’s Blood
During the eighteenth century, medical care aboard warships was universally
poor.9 The British navy, because of its low social status, poor living conditions,
and long stays at sea, attracted only the lowest-quality surgeons, mates, and phy-
sicians. On most vessels, surgery and medical treatment were performed in “the
cockpit,” a small, low, crowded, poorly ventilated, dimly lit room, far below deck.
Surgery often involved amputation. The patient was given rum, some other li-
quor, or opium, if available, and a piece of leather to chew on while the cutting
was accomplished. The mortality rate was profoundly high.
But there was no system for evacuating the wounded from battle stations to
surgery in the first place. Sailors dragged themselves to the cockpit or were
helped by comrades (for which they could be flogged for deserting their sta-
tions). Neither was there any system of triage. The wounded presented in line for
medical attention; the small complement of medical personnel enforced no pri-
ority. Thus, a slightly wounded sailor might be treated while more severely
wounded succumbed to shock and bleeding. It was customary to leave patients
to recover in hammocks in small areas separated, sometimes, by canvas parti-
tions; these primitive sick bays were located out of the way, in the darkest, least
used, and worst ventilated spaces of the ship.
When ground forces were transported, overcrowding increased and losses to
disease aboard ships were often higher than normal. To deal with the problem,
the Royal Navy provided “hospital ships” to carry the sick, but these vessels gen-
erally had no medical personnel aboard, and other ships’ physicians were forbid-
den to leave their own vessels to help. These “hospital ships” became little more
than stinking, disease-ridden, floating warehouses where the ill were kept until
they either recovered or died.
The French and Spanish navies attempted to return their dead to home port,
but in the British navy they went overboard; in fact, a wounded British sailor un-
able to make his way to surgery was likely to be thrown overboard while still
alive. A physician accompanying Lord Cathcart’s campaign in the West Indies in
1739 described the conditions on board: “The men were pent up between the
decks in small vessels where they had not room to sit upright; they wallowed in
filth; myriads of maggots were hatched in the putrefaction of their sores, which
had no other dressings than that of being washed in their own allowance of
brandy.” The ships described were anchored in the harbor of Cartagena (in
present-day Colombia); the dead were thrown overboard, where they floated
while sharks and birds of prey fed on them in full view of the surviving pa-
tients. The latter practice was operative when the legendary Vice Admiral
Horatio Nelson, commanding the British fleet at the battle of Trafalgar in
1805, was struck by a bullet that entered his shoulder, pierced his lung, and
S M I T H 1 0 1
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came to rest at the base of his spine. He retained consciousness for four hours,
during which he reportedly begged the flagship’s captain, Thomas Masterman
Hardy, not to have him thrown overboard. Captain Hardy agreed, and when
Nelson succumbed to his wounds his body was sealed in a cask of brandy for
transport back to his father’s parsonage.10
World War II: The LST(H) and the 7th Amphibious Force
Clearly, medical care at sea has evolved since the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Vice Admiral Daniel Barbey, commander of the 7th Amphibious
Force in the Pacific theater during World War II, later noted of his ship’s innova-
tive medical capabilities:
Even before battle casualties started coming in, the staffs of the amphibious ships in
Milne Bay [New Guinea] were unequal to the task of caring for those stricken with
tropical diseases. There was doubt that a hospital ship would be assigned to the Sev-
enth Amphibious Force . . . but as a partial substitute we thought we might be able to
convert an LST [tank landing ship] into a “first aid” ship if we could spare one and if
the Navy Department had no objections. . . . Anyhow, an official request was sent to
Washington outlining our reasons and needs. Then, to “save time” we went ahead
with the LST conversion plan on the assumption that it would be approved. . . . The
LST 464 was chosen because she would arrive in Sydney within a few days where the
shipyards could do the work. Two days after her arrival the conversion job was under
way and her character changed from a fighting ship to a ship of mercy. . . . Assem-
bling equipment in the States would not have been a matter of consequence, but get-
ting it in war short Australia required a lot of priorities. The ship’s medical staff . . .
were obtained by “thinning out” other ships and shore bases.11
LST 464 subsequently became the main reliance for medical service in the 7th
Amphibious Force. In early operations it was stationed at advanced bases to re-
ceive casualties from other amphibious craft for transport to Milne Bay. As other
ships joined the force and operations became larger, additional units were con-
verted into “casualty ships.” Surgical teams were embarked for the emergency
handling of the wounded evacuated to these medically outfitted ships, desig-
nated as LST(H)s. These special LSTs, which like normal units carried combat
troops and equipment to the assault, could remain “beached” for surgery after
disembarking them. Planners saw the value of using LST(H)s this way in the
Philippine Archipelago in 1944 at the battle of Leyte Gulf, and also of holding
one or two in reserve, to be committed to beaches overwhelmed with casualties
or without medical facilities. As recalled by Admiral Barbey, “Since Army hospi-
tals ashore could not be set up as rapidly as anticipated because of heavy rains,
LST 464 remained in the harbor and became the most important medical facil-
ity afloat or ashore for several days.”12
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Admiral Barbey concluded, “Our first aid ship did a magnificent job through-
out the war. Ironically, nine months after her conversion, and after she had han-
dled some thousands of sick and wounded, a letter was received from the Bureau
of Ships regretfully turning down our conversion request: ‘It is desired that all
LSTs continue to operate in the manner for which they were designed.’ The letter
was placed in those files most likely to be lost in combat, and the LST 464 contin-
ued to operate, if not in the manner for which designed, at least in the way we
most needed her.”13
S M I T H 1 0 3
Casualties being brought aboard a beached LST (U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Historian)
An LST tank deck with casualties (U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Archives, BUAER 435557)
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THE EVOLUTION OF HOSPITAL SHIPS
During the operation at Lingayen Gulf in 1945, six LST(H)s were beached to
provide surgical care. At Normandy in 1944, all LSTs were equipped to handle
returning casualties, and fifty-four were outfitted to perform surgery. Others
were subsequently equipped to serve as casualty control ships, regulating the
retrograde flow of the wounded to rear facilities. One was even made into a
floating blood bank. Such hospital LSTs, able to provide surgical care in a rela-
tively safe environment close to shore, performed even under fire at Iwo Jima
and Okinawa.
World War II
Another scenario-driven innovation of World War II that contributed to the
evolution of modern hospital ships was a group of three APHs, converted per-
sonnel transports with medical modifications. The attack personnel transport
(APA), although not designed or equipped to handle casualties, often bore the
brunt of initial casualty transfers from beach assaults—for example, at Iwo Jima.
An APH (which could carry landing forces inbound) was considered preferable,
because it had a complete staff of medical specialists and a large sick bay, so spe-
cialized treatment could be administered. Operating outside Geneva Conven-
tion protections, the camouflaged and heavily armed APH carried eight to
twelve medical officers and sixty hospital corpsmen (no nurses were assigned).
Each ship was capable of transporting 1,150 patients, with three hundred beds
reserved for major casualties, two main operating rooms, and two auxiliary sur-
gical facilities. These ships, built upon freighter hulls and equipped with
Higgins-type LCVP landing craft for shuttling casualties from shore, were held
in the “transportation area” of the assault force as evacuation ships. When bed
capacity was reached, the ships sailed, to avoid further exposure to air attacks. As
a general rule, APHs withdrew out to sea at night, but on occasion they remained
anchored about a thousand yards offshore, protected by smoke screens.
Upon U.S. entry into World War II, the Army Transport Services generally as-
sumed responsibility for evacuating Army sick and wounded, carrying them in
the hospitals of troop transports. During the amphibious campaigns in the
Mediterranean, small craft returning with casualties to transports or hospital
ships transferred their patients by litter hoist or by hoisting the ambulance boats
themselves to the rail and then transferring the patients directly to the deck. The
most expeditious method was to keep one boat, usually a disabled one, perma-
nently rigged for hoisting; ambulance boats would come alongside and directly
transfer their casualties to it.14
The troopships offered neither comfort nor sufficient care, and there was no
guarantee against enemy attack. Consequently, admirals William F. Halsey and
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Chester Nimitz decided instead to use Geneva Convention–protected ships
whenever possible, to evacuate those who needed considerable medical care en
route and would be unable to abandon ship without assistance in an emergency.
By early 1944, the Comfort (AH 6), Hope (AH 7), and Mercy (AH 8) had been
converted and placed into service with civilian crews and Army medical staffs.
Ultimately the Army had twenty-six such ships, the majority converted passen-
ger liners or troopships. Two Navy hospital ships had been in commission in
1941; three were added in 1944 and seven more in 1945. During the final phases
of the Pacific campaign, tactical doctrine for employment of Navy hospital ves-
sels changed, allowing them to function as mobile, definitive-care combat hos-
pitals rather than as transports only. Specially designed ships of the Haven (AH
12) class were also built to support this concept, which was to continue through
the recent conversion of tanker hulls to produce the current Mercy (T-AH 19)
and Comfort (T-AH 20). At Leyte Gulf, however, it became apparent that float-
ing hospitals were urgently needed at the objective, especially during the night,
when hospital ships were under orders to retire. Two arriving APAs were sum-
marily designated as casualty receiving ships and stationed offshore to provide
hospitalization at night. Small escort patrol craft, PCE(R)s, were also used as ad
hoc transports for casualty evacuation.15
The Korean War
During U.S. Marine landings at Inchon, LST(H)s once again demonstrated their
value in immediate medical support of combat operations. Concurrently, two
United Nations hospital ships supplemented by five U.S. hospital vessels served
as seaborne ambulances, and later as definitive-care platforms. Their original
mission was to transport casualties to Japan, providing care en route, but Korean
S M I T H 1 0 5
(Official U.S. Navy photograph)
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conditions made them far more valuable as rear-area hospitals. Some shuttled
between Korean ports as mobile hospitals; others remained in port for consider-
able periods conducting clinics similar to those of land-based facilities. Patients
were winched aboard from docks or from lighters and landed in helicopters.
USS Haven (AH 12), however, arrived in Inchon Harbor without a flight deck;
its innovative commanding officer improvised a deck with pontoon sections ob-
tained from the Army, mooring them perpendicular to the anchored ship on
both sides and equipping them with warning lights, wind-direction indicators,
and firefighting equipment. Rope ladders and temporary gangways provided ac-
cess. Up to four helicopters could be landed and their casualties brought aboard
ship with litter hoists.16
The Falklands
In 1982, in anticipation of the campaign to retake the Falkland Islands, Britain’s
Royal Navy requisitioned two commercial cruise ships, SS Uganda and SS Can-
berra, and refitted them for casualty care. The P&O ship Uganda, already con-
taining hotel, laundry, and other facilities required for patient care, was
converted and painted white, with red crosses, in Gibraltar within sixty hours. A
helicopter pad was fitted, as well as a ramp for rapid transfer of patients to the
main hospital on the promenade deck. Sections of the ship were converted to an
operating room suite, an intensive-care ward, a specialized burn-care unit, and a
“high dependency” skilled nursing unit, among other facilities. Over the ensu-
ing campaign Uganda’s medical staff treated 730 casualties and performed 593
surgical procedures.
The liner Canberra was converted to a troop carrier with a major surgical fa-
cility. Original plans called for Canberra to receive casualties, although it did not
1 0 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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qualify for Geneva Convention neutrality by virtue of having conveyed troops
and equipment to the theater. Unfortunately, after fierce attacks upon the fleet
supporting the landing force, the British removed Canberra from the opera-
tional area, and elements of its medical organization were hurriedly put ashore
at Ajax Bay.17
In addition, three ocean survey vessels were converted to Red Cross–identi-
fied ambulance ferry ships, which evacuated 593 casualties from Uganda to a
neutral Red Cross–supervised aero-medical staging facility 420 miles away in
Montevideo, Uruguay. From there they would be evacuated by air to Britain.18
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM/OPERATION GRANBY (Great Britain)
Royal Navy casualty projections in the 1991 Persian Gulf campaign indicated the
need for a minimum of a hundred beds in an afloat facility, able to admit mass
casualties of all types, initiate their management, and hold them for six days.
With no hospital ship then available, the Royal Navy designated the Royal Fleet
Auxiliary’s air training ship RFA Argus to be that platform. Its flight deck, with
five helicopter landing spots and two aircraft elevators, seemed ideal for move-
ment of casualties. The British drew plans to convert the forward hangar to a
hospital, in an airtight “subcitadel” (for chemical warfare protection). In three
weeks the hospital had been designed, built, equipped, and staffed. Using modu-
lar construction techniques procured from a commercial vendor, the
exoskeleton of the hospital was lifted to the flight deck in sections, lowered to the
hangar deck, fitted together, and moved into position.19
Argus arrived in the Gulf with a hundred-bed hospital independent of the su-
perstructure of the ship, including an intensive-care unit, a high-dependency
skilled nursing unit, a low-dependency unit, four operating tables in two operat-
ing rooms with full support services, and a medical team of 136 men and
women. The hospital was also supported by the ship’s air department, four Sea
King helicopters designated for casualty evacuation, and Royal Navy support
and liaison personnel. As a “grey hull” (a combatant in the eyes of international
law), Argus could operate in forward areas with unrestricted communication, as
ships with Geneva Convention neutrality protections cannot. This concept of
afloat tactical medical support afforded significantly shortened casualty-transit
time from frontline, at-risk naval units. Indeed, when a boiler exploded aboard
the USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) on 30 October 1990, a number of severely burned ca-
sualties were directly transferred to Argus for initial care.
FUTURE CHALLENGES
On 23 October 1983, a terrorist truck bomb carrying twelve thousand pounds of
TNT detonated at the headquarters of the Marine Battalion Landing Team 1/8 at
S M I T H 1 0 7
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the Beirut, Lebanon, airport, killing 241 American servicemen and wounding
112. Sixty-two of the latter were sent to the offshore amphibious ship Iwo Jima,
which had a surgical team. Several underwent surgery, and one died. A small
group was subsequently sent to the British hospital in Akritori, Cyprus; fifty-six
others were evacuated on a four-hour flight, during which an additional casu-
alty died, to distant facilities in Landstuhl, Frankfurt, and Wiesbaden, Germany,
as well as Naples, Italy (rather than those in neighboring Israel). As noted by a
subsequent flag-level review, the only mass-casualty plan in place had involved
Iwo Jima itself. There had been no effective coordinated theater plan for conti-
nuity of care, speedy evacuation, and regulation of victims of terrorist at-
tacks—that is, allocation of each to the most capable treatment facility. As the
review noted, “had the ratio of killed outright–to–wounded been reversed, so
that over 200 casualties had required treatment, rather than fewer than 100, the
medical system might well have failed.”20
Today, if a military force deployed from an offshore, dispersed, and geograph-
ically isolated strike group suffered a similar attack, a volume of instantaneously
generated casualties of similar magnitude would require prompt and effective
care. Any medical treatment system envisioned for geographically distributed
operations must provide more timely and competent treatment and evacuation
than was offered in Beirut. Given the unpredictable numbers of casualties pro-
duced by modern combat and the profound severity of survivable injuries in-
flicted by weaponry currently in use, it must be anticipated that existing forward
facilities may be overwhelmed by “casualty overload.” Even over three decades
ago, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, an Israeli Defense Force evacuation hos-
pital in the Sinai Desert, twenty to forty miles from the battle lines, received ca-
sualties in lots of from thirty-six to 140, and on one day 440. During the
twenty-one days of fighting the facility treated 4,070 wounded, two-thirds of
whom were in shock upon arrival.21
Distributed Expeditionary Sea Bases
Within a distributed sea-base context, a large volume of suddenly generated ca-
sualties could easily overwhelm the limited medical assets envisioned ashore.
Furthermore, the improvised explosive devices used in the Middle East have
shifted the spectrum of wounding. Advances in body armor and its wide deploy-
ment have diminished the incidence of mortal wounds of the chest and abdo-
men, but greater numbers of casualties with severe blast and fragmentary
neurosurgical injuries to the head, brain, and neck, as well as major blood vessel
(vascular) injuries of the extremities, may now survive long enough to reach for-
ward combat unit medical staffs. They would ultimately be transported to a
sea-based medical support center, if such were available.22
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In the postulated sea-base medical continuum, the most rudimentary eche-
lon of forward-located medical capabilities may be located at a battalion aid sta-
tion (BAS), known as medical care Level I. During the Vietnam conflict, timely
evacuation to such facilities was often assumed to be impractical, given delays
and the occasional inaccessibility of aid stations due to “cantonment,” whereby
troops lived in one location, were transported by helicopter to fight in another,
and were then extracted—and so did not carry their bulky BAS with them.
Sometimes medical aircraft evacuating severe injuries bypassed these limited
lower-level facilities and flew directly to more advanced (Level II) surgical facili-
ties capable of physician-assisted resuscitation, stabilization, and initial surgery
to prolong life. There were also more specialized in-country facilities with
subspecialty surgical capabilities, major blood-transfusion resources, and
advanced levels of nursing support (Level III).
In the sea-base concept, the large-deck amphibious assault ships within the
expeditionary strike groups (ESGs), of the LHA and LHD types, and presum-
ably the forthcoming LHA replacement, the LHA(R), with Level II medical facil-
ities and limited surgical capabilities for stabilizing injuries, will no doubt be the
designated “casualty receiving and treatment ships.” Heretofore they have car-
ried a standard Fleet Surgical Team augmentation of one general surgeon, an an-
esthesia provider, and other contingency medical and nursing augmentees.
Facilities for Level III, or advanced specialty treatment, as has been available
aboard T-AH hospital ships, will presumably be located elsewhere, perhaps in
the Maritime Preposition Force (Future), or MPF(F), or in seagoing platforms
provided by the other services. It has been suggested that newly designed ships
for the MPF(F) will contain extensive medical-support modules with surgical
specialty availability, allowing them to replace the aging hospital ships.23 These
modules would require, however, specialized and trained surgical, anesthesia,
and nursing personnel, triage and resuscitation space, equipment, and supplies
matched to risks combatant personnel are being exposed to, presumably major
blood-vessel injuries as well as life-threatening damage to the brain and spinal
cord.
But the large-deck amphibious ships could in reality offer only limited surgi-
cal capabilities for stabilizing injuries. The primary mission of these ships is
combat operations; the logistic, space, and mobility demands of casualty care
cannot realistically be expected to outweigh the combat and combat-service im-
peratives. Further, despite the purported sixteen “intensive care” beds, the four
surgical theaters of the LHA (and the six of the LHD), forty-seven ward beds
(suspended from vertical chains), and many hundreds of “overflow beds” (if
strike group personnel are off-loaded), space limitations result in the reality that
ESG vessels are not supplied with sufficient casualty-support logistics for
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sustained treatment of large numbers of casualties. More importantly, they lack
adequate numbers of the highly specialized medical and, especially, nursing per-
sonnel required by the wounds of blood vessels, brain, and spinal cord now
being suffered in irregular and urban warfare.
For their part, the two current T-AH hospital ships, although well equipped
and quite capable of advanced casualty care when adequately staffed with medi-
cal augmentees, are fading into operational obsolescence due to material aging,
slow speed, and deep draft (which bars them from littoral waters).24 Nimitz-class
nuclear aircraft carriers not only must primarily serve their operational roles
but, in fact, are only marginally capable of in-depth care of multiple casualties,
in terms of space, logistics, and personnel.
The LPD-17
The current amphibious fleet recapitalization plan involves the replacement of
eleven smaller, aging amphibious landing ships, LPD-4s, and all twelve dock
landing ships, LSDs, with new San Antonio–class LPD-17s. The new
twenty-five-thousand-ton expeditionary warship—50 percent larger than the
next-biggest LPD in the world—is designed to operate in an amphibious patrol-
ling role twenty-five miles off a defended shore and in a nuclear environment.
The ship is said to be capable of transporting seven hundred troops, with a surge
capacity to eight hundred, and of receiving contaminated casualties through a
specially designed triage center off the flight deck. It has two operating rooms, a
twenty-four-bed ward, and a stated overflow capacity of one hundred casualties.
The limits of its capabilities for combat injuries would be the breadth of avail-
able medical personnel and sufficient room available for handling a sudden
large influx of casualties.
Limits would also arise from the huge space requirements of contingency
medical logistic support. Combat casualties require large quantities of blood for
transfusion, including fresh whole blood with clotting components (the latter is
not found in either the LHA or LHD frozen blood repositories). During the
Vietnam conflict, 10 percent of the wounded required blood replacement, the
average being seven units per patient.25 Thirteen percent of those requiring
blood required eleven or more units, some as many as ninety, most of which
must be fresh blood with clotting components, to prevent further hemorrhag-
ing. In addition, combat surgical staffs need wide-ranging capabilities not com-
monly found among surgical generalists, as well as twenty-four-hour
availability of skilled nursing personnel and specific logistical support and re-
supply. Notwithstanding their seemingly advanced medical outfits, the San An-
tonio LPD and even the projected LSD(X) do not promise manifest,
demonstrable value in the initial management of severe combat casualties. Their
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principal medical role might well be that of secondary casualty-reception
facilities for wounded already treated and stabilized elsewhere.
The implications of such medical limitations were demonstrated during Op-
eration URGENT FURY in October 1983, when the United States inserted forces
into Grenada. In part because of an inadequately developed and insufficiently
communicated joint medical support plan, Army helicopter pilots, unfamiliar
with Navy ship profiles and flight decks, deposited critically injured personnel
on the flight deck of USS Trenton (LPD 14), a ship with a designated “operating
room” but minimal resources for critical care of casualties. One of these
wounded, an Army ranger, was in shock due to massive blood loss from a wound
through his chest and abdomen. With no blood bank, the general medical offi-
cers aboard Trenton were forced to match blood types with volunteer crew mem-
bers using their identification tags alone, a highly irregular and potentially
dangerous practice. They drew blood from the volunteers, literally on the spot,
and transfused it warm directly into their critically injured patient before trans-
ferring him to the distant USS Guam (LPH 9), the largest medically capable ship
in the operational area.26 Clearly, such older amphibious ships were inappropri-
ate as primary casualty-reception sites.
Modularization
The Navy is analyzing ways to replace stand-alone systems through networking
and modularity and to translate them into the basis for changes in the design of
warships, at savings in both cost and risk. One such program is the Littoral Com-
bat Ship. Its interchangeable, self-contained mission-specific modules, with
standard interfaces to other modules and shipboard systems, could be swapped
to meet various tactical needs—“plug and play.” New modules to support addi-
tional missions, such as emergency rescue and stability operations or environ-
mental monitoring and support, would likely evolve as well.27
As noted, “medical modules” have also been proposed for employment as
part of the MPF(F). The ships in this force will be kept in reduced operating sta-
tus in strategic reserves around the world and activated as necessary. As we have
also seen, a modular afloat medical facility (aboard RFA Argus) was successfully
used by the British during the first Gulf War. Is this concept of providing robust
medical support from the MPF(F) feasible?
Professional and paraprofessional personnel augmentees for MPF(F) mod-
ules would need to meet standards of care expected of land-based specialized
surgical units and nursing facilities. Likewise, since burns constitute a substan-
tial proportion of wounds inflicted in naval warfare (in the Falklands campaign,
33 percent of the wounds treated in the hospital ship Uganda were burns) ample
accommodation must be made for them (as well as for management of patients
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with blood vessel and neurological injuries).28 Since these modules would lie in
reduced operating status until mobilized, their functional status will require sys-
tematic monitoring, their perishable supplies tied to “just in time delivery ar-
rangements” wherever MPF(F) ships are maintained, and their professional
staffs identified, funded, and trained to function in that environment.
Missions for the Future
As currently envisioned, the squadron configuration selected for the Navy’s
Maritime Prepositioned Force (Future) will consist of fourteen ships: twelve
new-construction hulls and two existing T-AKR “dense-packed” ships carrying
supplies and ammunition. The twelve new ships will be: two T-LHA(R)s,
equipped with command and control facilities for a Marine expeditionary bri-
gade; one T-LHD with aviation command-and-control facilities; three modified
large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) sealift ships; three modified
Lewis and Clark–class (T-AKE 1) cargo and ammunition resupply ships; and
three mobile landing-platform-type vessels capable of housing 1,100 troops
each. These latter innovative vessels should be capable of meeting surface assault
requirements without external or aviation support by partially submerging and
allowing cargo to float on and off to connector ships.29 It is anticipated that since
the LHA(R)s and LHDs will be conducting forcible-entry and other belligerent
operations, they will require reclassification as warships when activated and un-
dergo augmentation by Navy crews. The others will operate, when activated, un-
der the aegis of the Military Sealift Command and be manned by civilian
mariners.
From a medical perspective, the first question to be asked, then, is: What are
command expectations for the medical assets functioning in a joint sea-base en-
vironment? The follow-on questions are: What resources will be necessary to
enable the joint/combined-force casualties to reach competent medical facilities
within the sea base in a timely manner? In what form will these facilities exist?
The answers will not only drive the activity of planners but will ultimately allow
more realistic implementation on site during conflict.
The bulk of casualties ashore would be evacuated to the sea base by air, and
when required by high-speed, seagoing “connector” vessels. (The LHA[R]s will
have no well decks; casualties will have to reach them exclusively by air, or by
other as-yet-unproven innovative methods. This may be particularly important
during times when weather is too foul for vertical transport. Alternatives such as
waterline access or loading platforms alongside may be required). The connec-
tors envisioned (for lift within the sea base as well as long distance) include the
Joint High Speed Vessel, the V-22 Osprey, and the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter.
In 2004 the Navy Warfare Development Command conducted an experiment to
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evaluate the High Speed Vessel as a medical platform. Unfortunately, it found,
surgical interventions on board were precluded by high ambient vibration,
noise levels, and vessel motion (including severe pounding) at high speeds or sea
states—aside from motion sickness of both patients and staff.30 These findings
might clearly impact upon survivability during long-range transport aboard
such vessels.
If the ships of the sea base are to be kept continuously available for new in-
coming casualties without overload, initially treated and stabilized casualties
need to be systematically forwarded to higher-level medical facilities, perhaps
thousands of miles away. This will require creativity, such as displayed by the
British at the Falklands, who used converted ocean survey ships as seagoing
ambulances.31
JOINT OPERATIONS: THE NEED FOR INTEGRATION
AND ACCOMMODATION
Unfortunately, a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on sea
basing has identified a lack of “unifying vision” within the defense community
with regard to sea-base development.32 It notes that individual services appear to
be outpacing the Defense Department. For example, the Army is developing its
own Joint High Speed Vessel and Joint High Speed Sealift Ship programs. Fur-
thermore, the Army is also beginning to develop its own Afloat Forward Staging
Base, intended to provide aerial maneuver for Army forces “from the sea.” One
option being explored is adding flight decks to commercial containerships.33
The inevitable result of such independent activity, however, is the potential for
redundancy and a lack of joint coordination, medical support not excepted.
In the absence of an overarching joint experimentation campaign plan, indi-
cates the GAO, many sea-basing investigations—including war gaming, opera-
tions analysis, workshops, technological development, modeling and
simulation, platform prototyping, and live demonstrations—have taken place
across the services, combatant commands, and other defense entities, without
the ability to evaluate solutions, including medical considerations, or to coordi-
nate efforts. Likewise, notes the report, there are insufficient modeling and sim-
ulation tools available. All this will clearly impact upon doctrine and training as
well as any concrete solutions that may be proposed for dealing with the combat
wounded. Ultimately, the Navy must coordinate with other services on stable
standards for a truly joint and interoperable medical support network.
THE BOTTOM LINE
The distributed sea base is to be composed of a series of complex platforms, con-
nectors, and logistics technologies. Logically, it must be driven by a common set
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of standards, requirements, time frames, and priorities. The advent of the inte-
grated base at sea requires adaptive medical systems “engineering” as well.
Within that metaphor, configuration management will be extremely important
to ensure connectivity among systems and components—in fact, a “system of
systems” approach—for both technical support and logistics.34 Various ship, air-
lift, and sealift components for casualty evacuation and treatment will need to
interface, and some of them will have to be interdependent. In addition, joint
operations from a sea base will require robust logistics technologies, as well as
command and control. Premature development of such systems to meet indi-
vidual service requirements for medical support rather than joint necessities
may facilitate initiatives that are duplicative, not interoperable, and possibly in-
compatible. Ultimately, adverse consequences for combat casualties may result.
The fundamental “bottom line” in any assessment of casualty care, whether
single service, joint, or combined, relates to time expended in transporting a
wounded person to a proper setting where a constructive medical intervention
can be performed. This must dominate every discussion of support systems.
(Delay in access to adequate care implies a precipitous decline into the ominous
“Triangle of Death,” which correlates with entry into an irreversible downward
spiral from which there is commonly no return to normal health.) Neglect of
this very specific requirement translates into acceptance by operational com-
manders of increased mortality and morbidity among accrued casualties.
A casual observer visiting a large deck amphibious ship may well be over-
whelmed with the abundance of equipment and space available to serve the
wounded. Deeper evaluation, however, will reveal that the mere availability of
equipment on a sea base ship will not, in itself, insure the availability of the req-
uisite care needed by large numbers of combat wounded. The thrust of any anal-
ysis of medical support at sea must emphasize the importance of the time factor,
as well as reference to previous empirical adaptations that have been imple-
mented to address the “time to receipt of substantive treatment” issue in various
operational theaters.
In conjunction with new and evolving operational approaches that empha-
size joint and combined operations, a medical support system and its compo-
nent material parts must be designed to supply speed, flexibility, and, above all,
responsiveness. The corollary is that logistical support, including medical ser-
vices, must always be adaptive. It must be capable of responding to the unique
nature of the conflict in hand and to the operational concepts employed by com-
batant commanders. In the current context, casualty care must be adapted to
geographically dispersed, or “distributed,” sea-based operations in the littorals,
with minimal medical facilities ashore.
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A harmonious vision of sea-based medical support, supported by pragmatic
leadership, is an absolute prerequisite to rapid and effective time-sensitive care
for the combat wounded during the unpredictable but probably inevitable litto-
ral conflicts of the future.
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